dedicated to promoting the rule of law. It is only when courts rule on remedies, Alter finds, that we should expect to see them 'adjusting to the realities of their environment'. In every case, however, the general thrust of all such analyses is the same. As Ran Hirschl (2008, 98) puts it, even the 'credible threat' of backlash from the Executive produces a 'chilling effect on judicial decision making patterns […] who says Supreme Court judges are not shrewd political animals?'.
In this study, by contrast, I present case studies of where courts have clearly failed to read signals emanating from the Executive, and have subsequently paid the price for not so doing -triggering 'backlash'. One case (Sesana 2006) comes from the Botswanan High Court, whilst another case (Campbell 2008) was brought against the Government of Zimbabwe in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal. By presenting these case studies I seek to make a modest argument for the initial plausibility, at least in restricted circumstances, of some claims made by legal theorists. Indeed, these case studies constitute (qualified) evidence in favour of the existence of a phenomenon that socio-legal scholars are generally especially keen to deny the existence of. This phenomenon is an emerging 'network' that Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997) once famously described as a 'global community of law'. It is a network of judges who ' conceive of themselves as autonomous actors forging an autonomous relationship with their foreign or supranational counterparts' (Slaughter 1994, 123) . On occasion, I will suggest, global judicial networks can be treated as independent variables (see introduction). They can explain outcomes of interest in ways the 'chilling effect' cannot. By seeking to send signals to their foreign or supranational counterparts, that is, courts have in fact ended-up undermining their institutional integrity, and have failed to act as 'shrewd political animals' in the domestic sphere.
Judicial Networks and Theoretical Clarification
This argument must now, however, be qualified by a whole series of caveats and qualifications.
Political scientists are in many respects right to be sceptical about the significance and conceptual rigour of Slaughter and Helfer's 'global community of law'. As is typical in analyses of 'networked' international relations, this scholarship usually fails to specify how its object can be measured or identified. It makes no use, notably, of social network analysis (SNA) tools that have been specifically designed for this purpose (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009) . Too often, that is to say, networks have 'remained a metaphor rather than an instrument of analysis' (Kahler 2009, 2-3) . AnneMarie Slaughter's (1994; canonical formulations have been singled out for particular criticism in this respect (cf. Meierhenrich 2009 , who also takes aim at Koh 1997 , Raustiala 2002 and Slaughter and Zaring 2006 . At least three sets of her claims have been particularly contested. I will now take each in turn, outlining the set of claims and the criticisms made of them, before explaining how the analysis that follows strives to answer these criticisms.
Slaughter's first set of contested claims relates to the types of 'judicial network' comprising the 'global community of law'. On this point she herself betrays some ambivalence. At her most ambitious, Slaughter (1994, 131-2) has suggested that 'mutual recognition as participants in a common enterprise' now characterises relations between courts in a 'widening community of liberal states' that has emerged since the end of the Cold War (see also Burley 1992) . Such networks, then, straddle issue areas, families of legal systems, and national and supranational levels of jurisdiction; they are 'participants simultaneously in national legal systems and the construction of a global legal system' (Slaughter 2004, 243) . For Slaughter's critics this overlooks how, in most issue areas at least, patterns of transnational inter-judicial communication remain largely limited to those networks created by legal education (Law and Chang 2011, 529-530) . It also makes the common mistake of 'single-minded [ly] ' focusing on a 'particular class of recent decisions that are claimed to be -though not demonstrated as -part of a wider trend' (Black and Epstein 2007, 796-7) . A widespread tendency here, these critics allege, is that of providing examples from some areas of human rights jurisprudence -where the audiences for decisions may in fact be genuinely global -and using them to prove the existence of more general patterns (compare Carozza 2003) . Indeed, Slaughter (1994, 132) herself seems at times to acknowledge this point, conceding that global networking is 'particularly potent in the human rights field', even if it 'potentially extends to all fields'. The bulk of her evidence certainly is derived from human rights law, and not from areas where we would expect global networks to be less significant, such as electoral and immigration law (see Schauer 2000, 256-7) . In this study, accordingly, I restrict the scope of my claims to a certain class of case involving human rights; that area of the law where, in the words of New Zealand's most senior judge, there has been the greatest movement towards a 'common law of the world' (Cooke 2004, 273 ; for a helpful comparison with sharia jurisprudence see Waldron 2012, 212-4) . I make no suggestion that my conclusions are more widely generalisable.
Slaughter's second set of contested claims relates to these networks' modes of operation.
Networks may be devoted to the exchange of information and ideas, legal harmonisation, or enforcement. In every case, however, they are characterised by persuasion and 'dialogue' between the various nodes in the network; a dialogue which can now be observed at a growing number of global inter-judicial conferences, and via the increasingly common practice of courts citing foreign decisions (e.g. Slaughter 2003, 192; 2004, 51, 65; ; for more cautious formulations see Slaughter 1994) . To this Slaughter's critics have responded that, on closer inspection, her 'dialogue' appears to be more of a 'monologue'. On Slaughter's view, for example, both the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court (ZACC) 'have both been highly influential' in promoting the citation of foreign decisions. Yet by Law and Chang's (2011, 532) reckoning the South African court actually cites its Canadian counterpart almost three hundred times more often than the inverse. Indeed, Section 35(1) of South African constitution actually (uniquely) provides courts with explicit encouragement to use 'comparable foreign case law' when interpreting it. And ZACC judges are even allowed to hire up to five clerks from around the world, in addition to their two South African clerks, to assist with this (Bentele 2009, 234) . The primary explanation for the drafting of this extraordinary constitutional provision was, of course, 'a reaction against South Africa's recent history as a pariah or an outcast nation' and a desire 'to identify the new South Africa explicitly with the opinions and practices of the rights-respecting world' (Schauer 2000, 259; Waldron 2012, 239, n.13 ). This example highlights how the language of 'dialogue' may serve to conceal unequal degrees of membership in 'the global community of law'.
Empirical research has suggested that contemporary practices of citing foreign courts are not in fact new (Black and Epstein 2007, 797-9) . While some of Slaughter's more radical critics have pointed out that historically such practices have been most common within imperial contexts; a pattern of unequal relations between courts replicated in contemporary 'inter-judicialism' (Buxbaum 2004) . In what follows, accordingly, I do not use the term 'network' to imply horizontal or un-coercive relationships 1 .
My Southern African examples, broadly speaking, will be drawn from courts in the global peripherylike the ZACC in South Africa itself -seeking 'to be received or respected or esteemed by a particular group or community of nations' (Schauer 2000, 258) .
Controversies about the significance of inter-judicial conferencing, meanwhile, are closely bound up with those surrounding Slaughter's third set of contested claims: those relating to the methods appropriate for the study of judicial networks. Some critics have raised concerns about Slaughter's points could be proved. As Meierhenrich (2009, 87) asks, 'what are the measurable consequences of international conferencing?'. At this stage Slaughter could, perhaps, point to the words of judges themselves: a kind of evidence that she uses to establish the significance of foreign citation practices (e.g. Slaughter 1994, 130; 2003, 194-7; 2004, 69-79) . Judges such as Michael Kirby -a former Chief Justice of the Australian High Court, and one those 'activists' often cited by Slaughter and other enthusiasts for inter-judicial dialogue -have certainly testified in unambiguous terms about the effects of such conferences 2 . Kirby (2006, 334; 2007, 36) has even go so far as to describe a 1988 meeting in 1 In social network analysis, it should be noted, the word does not have these connotations, which it has acquired in the international relations literature (see Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009, 562) . 2 Perhaps the most-cited 'judicial activists' are Canadian Constitutional Court Justice Claire l'Heureux-Dubé, and United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer. Comments by Breyer (2003, 268) to the American Society of International Law, cited by Kersch (2009, 95) Critics are of course justified in asking whether the mere 'impressions of a random and unrepresentative sample of judges' suffice to establish general trends, just as they do well to point out that many other judges actually regard these meetings as little more than opportunities for 'small talk' (Meierhenrich 2009, 88; Law and Chang 2011, 567 To be clear, finally, I am not claiming here that there will ever be a case where a court is only concerned to address itself to an audience of legal practitioners. To do so would be to fall into the same trap as so much legal theorising, and to treat adjudication as a purely self-contained activity uncontaminated by wider social forces (for excellent discussion Cotterrell 1995, 91-112) . It would also be doubly absurd in an African context, where Executive interference with judicial autonomy is so commonplace (see VonDoepp and Ellett 2011, 151-2) 4 . Here informal 'signalling' of Executive preferences is frequently of the most unambiguous kind, with bribes, threats of violence, and physical attacks all being considerably more common than in Latin America, for example (Llanos, Weber, Heyl and Stroh 2014, 14) 5 . What I do want to suggest, however, is that the evidence from my cases -however exceptional they may be -should be enough to illustrate the inadequacy of analytical frameworks that categorically exclude (global) judicial networks from their 'signalling games'.
Case studies
In both the case studies which follow I highlight three salient features that illustrate the argument outlined above. There can be no doubt, firstly, about the degree to which Executives favoured certain In both cases, secondly, dominant legal opinion suggests that the court could, at little or no legal cost, have decided the case in a manner less threatening to the Executive. Legally speaking, that is, they had a choice. But Executive signalling -which was inevitable given the political stakes clarified abovefailed to elicit the 'shrewd' political behaviour or 'tactical balancing' anticipated by strategic models of decision-making (Hirschl 2008, 98; Kapiszewski 2011, 490) . By behaving as if they were signalling to global legal audiences, courts then provoked, thirdly, backlash from the Executive. In both cases the nature of this backlash was of a kind which VonDoepp and Ellett (2011, 152) characterise as a 'general institutional assault'. As I will show, in the Campbell case from Zimbabwe this assault was even more profound, and resulted in fundamental institutional restructuring. In the Botswanan case, meanwhile, backlash was limited to 'deliberately failing to abide by court rulings or bypassing judicial institutions' -notwithstanding some speculation about the effect of the court ruling on recent judicial appointments (see VonDoepp and Ellett 2011, 152) . Both cases are ones which I have been following closely since 2011, and I have been able to conduct twenty interviews with their observers and participants.
(a) Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe (2008)
I begin with the case that led to the most dramatic instance of backlash against an international court in recent history: the decision by Southern African states to strip the SADC Tribunal of its human rights jurisdiction (Alter 2014, 58; Alter, Gathii and Helfer 2015) . The ferocity of these states' reactions is only comprehensible once the symbolic significance of land in Zimbabwean politics is understood (contrast the account that focuses on non-intervention in Nathan 2013). For those readers unfamiliar with this history I therefore begin by providing some brief context below. Those readers looking for more background are referred to the magisterial account in Alexander (2006) .
(i) Historical context
In 1978 40 per cent of land in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) belonged to white farmers. Whites as a whole made up less than 4 per cent of the population (Selby 2006, 117) . Thanks to the Land Tenure Act of 1969, which intensified colonial segregation, Africans could not own land privately. In 1980, famously, and under pressure from newly-independent Mozambique, the ZANU and ZAPU liberation movements agreed to a democratic transition which was significantly below their initial expectations (Mtisi, Nyakudya, and Barnes 2009, 165) . The country's independence constitution, most notably, entrenched property rights for 10 years. The decade that followed therefore saw a series of administrative orders gazetting land defeated in the courts on procedural grounds. These cases were usually paid for from a Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) legal defence fund established for the purpose (Selby 2006, 239) . Some influential ruling-party technocrats, who believed in the legitimacy of legal routes to land redistribution, complained in this period, amid much controversy, that the higher courts imposed overly-restrictive conditions on land redistribution (e.g. Alexander 2006, 181; Pilossof 2012, 34) .
By the late 1990s, however, as is well-known, ZANU-PF (the ruling party) faced economic crisis and its first serious electoral threat: the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (see Dorman 2001; Raftapolous 2009). Faced with becoming the first ex-liberation movement in the region to lose power, it abandoned its self-presentation as a modernising regime committed to rational-legal norms. In their place it adopted a (not wholly unsuccessful) nationalist and anti-colonial legitimation strategy that scholars of the region have labelled 'patriotic history' (Ranger 2004; Tendi 2010, chapter 8; Southall 2013, 5) . It now forcibly expropriated commercial farmland -which it ceased to consider as simply a national economic asset -and it now sought to justify its authority in rural areas on nationalist and (in places) neo-patrimonial terms (cf. Moore 2005; Marongwe 2008, chapter 5) . In 2001 President Mugabe declared that 'the courts can do what they want. They are not courts for our people and we should not even be defending ourselves in these courts' (Chan 2003, 167) . Generally speaking, however, the government continued to insist on the legality of its actions, even going to considerable lengths to retrospectively rationalise land seizures via legislation (e.g. Kibble 2013, 93-4) . . By doing so, however, they were able to bring the case before the soon-to-be-opened SADC Tribunal in Windhoek; one of a new breed of international courts allowing individual petition which had emerged in Africa since the early 1990s (Alter 2014, 82-84) .
The Campbell case in Windhoek centered around three issues: 1) the legality of a clause in Amendment 17 ousting court jurisdiction, 2) the necessity for farmers to be compensated at a 'fair' rate, and 3) the question of whether Fast-Track Land Reform (FTLR) as a whole amounted to racial discrimination. This last point was, of course, a direct challenge to the 'patriotic history' narrative at the heart of ZANU-PF ideology, and a dramatic example of Hirschl's (2008) 'judicialisation of megapolitics'. Initially, in response, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) sought to delay proceedings. A month's breathing space was reportedly gained, for example, by citing a broken fax machine in the President's office (Freeth 2011, 164 'we wish to observe here that if: (a) the criteria adopted by the respondent in relation to the land reform programme had not been arbitrary but reasonable and objective; (b) fair compensation was paid in respect of the expropriated lands, and (c) the lands expropriated were indeed distributed to poor, landless and other disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups, rendering the purpose of the programme legitimate, the differential treatment afforded to the Applicants would not constitute racial discrimination' (in Zongwe 2009, 23) .
Contrary to the expectations of most strategic models of decision-making, only on the issue of remedies did the Tribunal go at least some way towards catering for Executive preferences (see Alter 2014, 60 ).
The GOZ was only 'directed to take all necessary measures through its agents to protect the possession, occupation and ownership of the lands of the Applicants'. It was not required to do the (now) impossible, and 'restore the rule of law in commercial farming areas' within six months, as had been ordered by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court in 2001 (see Pilossof 2012, 54) .
(iii) Backlash
This cautious approach to remedies, however, was not enough to insulate the court from backlash. Almost immediately after Campbell, the GOZ began arguing that the Tribunal was illegally building legitimacy for the EctHR by shielding it from rulings striking directly at member states' sovereign prerogatives (Madsen 2007, 144-152) . SALC, who had sought to dissuade the Campbell litigants from taking the case to court, criticised the SADC Tribunal for not taking a similarly long-term approach towards safeguarding its institutional integrity. In 2013 Director Nicole Fritz reportedly argued, for instance, 'that the Tribunal shouldn't have handled such high impact and controversial cases from its inception but should rather have focused on building legitimacy in its rulings over matters which weren't as controversial. In this way states would learn to accept its authority' (SAFPI 2013; also Lloyd Kuveya, interview, 3rd May 2012).
The five judges that ruled on Campbell, however, were not drawn from these networks. in Tswana ideology' (Wilmsen 2002, 829) . A century later these views had only become stronger; reinforced by spectacular developmental success of the Tswana elite, and by its welfarist orientation (see Saugestad 2001, 120-5) .
The immediate background to the case, however, related to a wave of relocations of San from the CKGR dating from mid-1997. In the previous year soon-to-be-President Festus Mogae had referred to the inhabitants of the reserve as 'Stone Age creatures who must change, or otherwise, like the dodo, they will perish' (Good 2004, 16 ). In March 1997 parliament then voted 6,000,000 Pula (approximately $1.4 million) to develop a settlement for these 'nomadic' populations at New !Xade. Its stated objective was to facilitate the provision of social services. In May-June it moved decisively, resettling threequarters of the Reserve's population (see R. Hitchcock 1999, 113-6; Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 63; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 306-7) . Almost immediately controversy erupted over the sufficiency of consultation, information provided, (promised) compensation paid, and whether threats had been made about the use of force in future (Saugestad 2011, 41; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 308-312) .
Between 1997 that game licenses would no longer be renewed, and services, including water, no longer be provided for those who had returned to the CKGR (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 67) . In January 2002 (armed) police and DWNP staff removed water storage tanks, closed the last remaining borehole, separated some families, and dismantled (sometimes bulldozing) property; relocating all but a few households to the new resettlement villages (Saugestad 2011, 42; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 314) . The government blamed Survival International (SI) for its change of heart, reacting to a confrontational advocacy campaign which accused it of wanting to extract 'conflict diamonds' from the newly-vacated lands in the Reserve (Taylor and Mokhawa 2003) .
(ii) Sesana NGO supporters of the San were now left with no choice but to litigate a dispute striking at the heart of 'formative collective identity' in Botswana (Hirschl 2008, 98) . The widespread initial 'expectation [was] that land rights would be introduced into the case as a more explicit claim for ownership, not only for lawful occupation'; a direct challenge to the government's oft-repeated view that 'all Batswana are indigenous to the country', and thus equal in their entitlements to land (Saugestad 2011, 45) . In the event, however, the litigants' final list of demands were more modest (at least on first look). They asked the Court to rule on four issues: clearly not a case of courts seeking safe harbour in the 'letter of the law' (Alter 2014, 281) .
As in
Campbell, that is, the judges were presented with a range of legally acceptable options.
Easily the most dramatic of the judges' conclusions was Judge Dow's finding that, for the first time in the country's history, the government should be ordered to treat different ethnic groups differently. Finding that the (locally contested) international law concept of 'indigenous peoples' was relevant to Botswana, she found that the 'Basarwa [San]':
'and to some extent the Bakgalagadi, belong to an ethnic group that is not socially and politically organised in the same manner as the majority of other Tswana speaking ethnic groups and the importance of this is that programmes and projects that have worked with other groups in the country will not necessarily work when simply cut and pasted to the Applicants' situation' ( Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 186).
These findings were accompanied by forthright criticisms of the Executive:
'this is a case that questions the meaning of 'development' and demands of the respondent to take a closer look at its definition of that notion. One of colonialism's greatest failings was to assume that Even taken by itself, however, the final ruling of the Court as a whole represented a startling rebuke to the government. Despite finding in its favour on services, the Court nonetheless found that the applicants had been in lawful possession of their lands before 2002; had been unlawfully deprived of these lands; had been unlawfully refused special game licenses; and had been unlawfully refused permits to enter the Reserve (Saugestad 2006, 1-2) .
(iii) Backlash
In the 8 years since the case there has, as yet, been very little indeed that could be characterised as compliance. In the immediate aftermath of the case, and whilst still in the glare of the international media, the government announced that it would not be appealing the judgement (see Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 354-5) . Since then, however, it has responded with 'restrictive interpretation[s]' and 'considerable ... foot-dragging' (Saugestad 2011, 50) . It announced that only named applicants could return to the CKGR without permits, and even they would need identity documents. Domestic animals and permanent structures were banned. Water from outside would be allowed if transported at the applicants' own expense. And applications for game licenses would have to be sent to the DWNP for individual assessment. As of March 2012 not a single one had been granted (Saugestad 2006, 2; ZipsMairitsch 2013, 354-6) . After a follow-up case that temporarily prevented relocations from an 'unrecorded settlement' in Ranyane -where the applicants were also represented by Gordon Bennett, the There has also been some speculation in Botswana that backlash against Sesana has also been responsible for 'personnel speculation' and the 'packing [of the] court with supporters while purging it of opponents' (VonDoepp and Ellett 2011, 152-3 What is clear, nonetheless, is that non-compliance with CKGR rulings has been one of the foremost charges that the organised legal profession has levelled against the government over the last five years, during a period when it has been agitating for constitutional reform (cf. Ganetsang, 21 amendments to the Citizenship Act had effectively denied her children citizenship rights on the grounds that her husband was a citizen of the United States. She saw the lawsuit as a 'test case' with crucial implications for 'implementing change' for African women (Pfotenhauer and Dow 1991, 104-5) . It was the first civil action to allege that parliament had violated human rights and exceeded its constitutional powers (Pfotenhauer and Dow 1991, 101) . Its success coincided with a comparative explosion in Botswanan constitutional litigation (see Fombad 2011, 18) . Now, in Sesana, Dow made the similarly path-breaking finding that 'the Applicants belong to a class of peoples that have now come to be recognized as 'indigenous peoples''. This was an opinion outrageous to the government that Dow Like Judge Pillay, Dow had also long been a part of international human rights networks. In the 1980s, soon after completing her legal training in Edinburgh, she was responsible for creating many of Botswana's first organisations dedicated to women's rights (van Allen 2007, 476; Bauer and Ellett 2016) .
(iv) Analysis
As a result, by 199,1 she was able to attract support from the Swedish International Development Agency and various Southern African and American NGOs for her challenge against the Citizenship Act (Dow 1995, preface) . Then, in her subsequent career on the bench, as summarised by Duma Boko, she became a judge 'who was willing to listen to arguments that to some conservative judges would seem to be outrageous. In the CKGR case, I think she brought it home in the plainest manner' (in Segwai, 14 
Conclusion
In both the Campbell and Sesana cases surveyed above backlash against the court was both predictable and easily avoidable through legal means. In Campbell, moreover, activist networks even mobilised in advance of the judgement to prevent such backlash from taking place. Yet in both cases Executive signalling towards the court clearly failed to have the 'chilling effect' anticipated by strategic models of judicial decision-making. Judges in fact decided the cases in a range of ways, ranging from wholesale agreement with the government's position (Justice Dibotelo), to a full-frontal challenge to the government's vision of 'formative collective identity' (Judge Pillay and Justice Dow). This paper has provided indirect and speculative evidence that the degree of insertion in global judicial networks functions as an independent variable in these cases, helping to explain such variation. That it would function thus in this particular class of cases -high-profile human rights cases allowing courts to signal desires for membership in the 'global community of law' -is unsurprising. Cases such as these are the only ones in which critics of judicial network scholarship have conceded (albeit implicitly) that networking may have significant effects. Further research would of course be needed to validate these conclusions; research that grapples with the formidable practical difficulties associated with identifying and mapping networks on a global scale.
